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Process-oriented Risk Assessment Methodology for 
Manufacturing Processes Evaluation 
Abstract: A process-oriented quantitative risk assessment methodology is proposed. Risks
involved in a process and the corresponding risk factors are identified through a novel objective-
oriented risk identification approach and analyzed qualitatively in the Process FMEA. Critical 
risks with high RPN (risk priority number) values identified in the FMEA are incorporated in the 
process model for further quantitative analysis in the simulation environment. To this end, risk 
measures of the critical risks are determined for which data is collected during simulation 
execution. Using the proposed methodology as a decision-making tool, alternative scenarios are 
developed and compared with each other as well as with two fictive situations to elicit 
normalized values for the risk measures employing value function approach. To ease the 
decision-making process in case of multiple risk measures, a global risk indicator is developed 
by aggregating the individual normalized risk measures through a 2-additive Choquet Integral 
operator. The global risk indicator is then used to rank the alternative scenarios on the basis of 
desirability. The methodology is illustrated with a case study issued from parts manufacturing 
but is applicable to a wide range of other processes. 
Keywords: Risk assessment, process modeling, objectives modeling, discrete event simulation 
and decision-making support system. 
1. Introduction
In the process context, risk stems from uncertainty regarding the ability of a process to deliver 
“the value proposition”– and the consequences thereof. The value proposition refers to the 
implicit or explicit promise a company makes to its stakeholders to deliver a particular 
combination of values (Martinez, 2003). To make sure the promise would be delivered; process 
risks should be modeled and assessed to account for the uncertainties and their consequences on 
the “value proposition”. Risk management is carried out in the same spirit to protect and 
maximize the process value for its stakeholders (Shah et al. 2012; Sienou et al. 2008).  
To deal with risk in product/system/project context, various tools and techniques have been 
developed so far. An exhaustive review of these tools and techniques can be found in the 
literature (Tixier et al., 2002; Moeller, 2007) and risk management standards (Knight, 2010; 
L.A. Shah*; A.Etienne*; A.Siadat*; F.B.Vernadat**
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ISO/IEC31010:2009). These techniques have different goals; some of them are used to evaluate 
multiple scenarios, depending on which risky event occurs such a decision tree, strength, 
weakness, opportunity and threat analysis (SWOT), SWIFT Analysis and What-If 
Analysis(Cagliano et al., 2015). Other techniques, instead, focus on the origins and implications 
of the risk events. Commonly used techniques in this category are: failure modes and effects 
analysis (Braaksma et al., 2012; Case et al., 2010), fault tree analysis(Cheng et al., 2013; 
Limnios, 2007), event tree analysis (Aven, 2008). In addition to these analytical techniques, 
Monte Carlo simulation provides a statistical approach towards risk assessment (Lee et al., 2013; 
Moghaddam, 2015; Mun, 2006).  
These techniques have their strengths and weaknesses and are aimed at different application 
domains. For instance, FMEA is often used in aeronautical, automotive and other industries 
producing machinery, electronic or electro-mechanical components (Su and Chou, 2008). Hazard 
and Operability (HAZOP) technique, however, is commonly applied in the chemical industry 
(Dunjó et al., 2010; Labovskỳ et al., 2008). Furthermore, Hazard Analysis and Critical Control 
Points (HACCP) is developed specifically for the beverage and food industry (Pierson, 2012; 
Sun and Ockerman, 2005). Fault tree and event tree techniques have been applied widely in the 
nuclear power plants and also in the chemical industry (Groso et al., 2012). Similarly, the CREA 
(Clinical Risk and Error Analysis) technique is developed for medical domain (Trucco and 
Cavallin, 2006). 
Irrespective of the application domain, often the risk analysis methods are developed to model 
and analyze risks from a subsystem perspective. A system is reduced to subsystems or 
component parts and each part is then dealt independently. For example, in FMEA only one 
component is considered at a time and the rest are assumed to work perfectly. Therefore, the 
method is not suitable to model critical combinations of component failures (Aven, 2008, p. 64). 
Same is the case with many of the risk assessment techniques (Groso et al., 2012). However, a 
failure may not happen because of one risk event but a combination of mutually inclusive risk 
events may lead to one or more failures (Shah, 2013). 
To address this issue, one way is to approach the risk assessment problem via process modeling 
and simulation. Because processes are everywhere no matter what organization or scenario one 
chooses. They manifest whenever a service or product is delivered. Among the many benefits of 
process-based initiatives are process improvement, process analysis for possible problems and 
issues and performance measurement (Indulska et al., 2009). But, the risk management discipline 
and thus the techniques thereof have been developed separately from the operational concern of 
the business processes (i.e. manufacturing, sales, inventory management etc.). Although risk is 
the element that can affect (business) process negatively, it is still managed independently (Shah, 
2013). A sufficient link is missing between process and quantitative risk models(Scott and 
Vessey, 2002). To better manage risk of a process, it should be integrated, and evaluated 
dynamically (through simulation) within the process to account for the uncertainties and chain of 
events intertwined with activities of a process. 
Recently, some research work has been carried out to either treat process risk or integrate risk in 
the process perspective. Two streams of studies have emerged: the management of risk in 
(business) processes (Cope et al., 2010; Neiger et al., 2009; Sienou et al., 2008; Suriadi et al., 
2014) and process-based risk management (Kayis et al., 2007; Cha et al., 2009; Kusiak and 
Zakarian, 1996; Sackmann, 2008; Yu, 2011). The former is called risk-aware business process 
management and the latter is process-oriented risk management. In any case, this convergence of 
risk management and process management is a positive development for maximizing the value 
of the process. It is not surprising given the tendency of process based organization design in the 
last two decades (Aguilar-Savén, 2004; Dumas, 2013; Hammer and Champy, 2003). 
Furthermore, the importance of such a research has also been confirmed in a number of studies 
(Becker et al., 2010; Chapman, 2006; Rikhardsson et al., 2006). Nevertheless, the research and 
practice of risk management in association with processes is still very limited and requires 
further exploration. The proposed techniques have not yet made inroads into the industry despite 
the fact that process based management and frameworks are widely practiced nowadays (e.g. 
supply chain operations reference model, SAP ERP system).  
To advance the theory of risk in the process context, this study proposes a process-based risk 
management methodology. The central theme of the study is to provide methods and techniques 
for risk assessment and management for process-based organizations. The methodology draws 
on, for the most part, the risk modeling concepts in the process context for the risk measurement 
model from the literature (Larson and Kusiak, 1996) and extends it to integrate risk 
identification, evaluation and decision-making mechanisms to better manage risk of industrial 
systems.  
2. RISK MEASUREMENT MODEL 
In the process perspective, uncertainty lies “internally” and “externally” to the activity in the 
form of risk factors. External risk factors can be machine breakdown, unreliable supplier, natural 
disaster etc. Internal risk factors of an activity is associated to the uncertainty regarding the 
estimation of its work content (Salah., 2005). For instance, assigning an activity (operation) 
having low capability index to meet a specific objective (e.g. specification of a product) or 
underestimating activity duration. Whether external or internal, a risk factor can trigger the 
occurrence of any undesirable events that ultimately affect the activity progress towards 
objective(s) attainment (cf. Figure 1).  
Risk factor Risk event Objective
Causes Influences
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Figure 1: Risk factors and objectives relationship (Vernadat et al., 2013) 
It is therefore essential to identify and then assess the impact of risk events originating from the 
risk factors (both external and internal) on the defined process objectives. For this purpose, 
risk  𝑅 , in the first place, is parameterized in terms of risk scenario  𝑆 , likelihood 𝑃 and 
consequence 𝐶 as expressed by Equation 1: 
 𝑅 = (𝑆, 𝑃, 𝐶) (1) 
Next, it is modeled and assessed in the activity environment. The underlying assumption for 
activity-based risk assessment is that each activity in a process is exposed to risk factors RFi, 
(  𝑖 = 1,… . , 𝑛)  and thus can trigger one to many risk events, which in turn can affect the 
fulfilment of process objectives (as illustrated in Figure 2). 
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Figure 2: Activity exposure to risk factors 
To quantify the process risks 𝑅𝑖, the likelihood of a risk event multiplied by its consequences on 
an individual activity are modeled using Equation 2: 
 𝑅𝑖𝑠𝑘 𝑜𝑓 𝑡ℎ𝑒 𝑎𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑖𝑡𝑦 𝑖 =  𝑃𝑖𝑗  (C𝑖𝑗
𝑞 + C𝑖𝑗
𝑐 + C𝑖𝑗
𝑡 …) (2) 
𝑃𝑖𝑗 Probability of a risk event 𝑗 on activity 𝑖 
C𝑖𝑗
𝑞 , C𝑖𝑗
𝑐 , C𝑖𝑗
𝑡  Consequences on quality, cost and time objectives, respectively [consequences 
spectrum) (je en comprends pas) 
The global risk for activity 𝑖 due to risk event 𝑗 is given by Equation 3:  
 Ri =∑(Pij × C𝑖𝑗
𝑜𝑏𝑗)
J
j=1
 (3) 
Where, Ri is the risk magnitude of activity  i 
However, all risk events are not equally important in any given scenario. Some risks are more 
important than others depending on what objective(s) they are influencing. Therefore, a 
weighting factor or importance index 𝑑𝑖𝑗 is introduced to model the importance of the risk events 
in the scenario 𝑆. So, Equation 3 can be rewritten as: 
 Ri =∑𝑑𝑖𝑗(Pij × C𝑖𝑗
𝑜𝑏𝑗)
J
j=1
 (4) 
Therefore, the global risk of the process path 𝑃𝑘 is given by Equation 5: 
 R(pk) = ∑ Ri∀ i∈pk = ∑ ∑ 𝑑𝑖𝑗(Pij × C𝑖𝑗
𝑜𝑏𝑗)Jj=1∀ i∈pk  (5) 
Where k = 1, .2,…K, representing a process in the network of processes (scenarios) 
In the case of multiple sub-processes (AND, OR and XOR junctions in the context of IDEF3), 
special cases apply. 
In the case of multiple parallel sub-processes (AND junction), since all successor activities 
immediately after the junction are performed, so the probability 𝑃𝑟(𝑃𝑘) of occurrence of each 
path set 𝑃𝑘 is one, so Equation (5) is applied to all possible path set (parallel sub-processes) in 
order to calculate the process risk of the scenario understudy.  
For mutually exclusive alternative sub-processes (XOR Junction), since only one subsequent 
sub-process after branching can be performed, the summation of all probabilities of occurrence 
of the sub-processes therefore should be equal to 1. So the probability of the path set (or 
scenario) in the mutually exclusive setting is such that: 
 ∑𝑃𝑟(𝑃𝑘)
K
k=1
= 1 (6) 
So, the expected risk of the process 𝑃 made of 𝐾 path sets is: 
 𝐸(𝑅𝑝) =  ∑𝑃𝑟(𝑃𝑘)
K
k=1
( ∑ ∑𝑑𝑖𝑗(Pij × C𝑖𝑗
𝑜𝑏𝑗)
J
j=1∀ i∈pk
) (7) 
Regarding mutually inclusive alternative sub-processes (OR Junction), the probability (𝑃𝑟) of any 
process 𝑘  after branching is unconditional and is calculated differently. If the number of 
alternative sub-processes (𝑁) after branching is greater than 2, then there are 2𝑁−1 combinations 
of subsequent sub-processes. Let us assume that 𝑈𝑗  is the set containing sub-processes in 
combination 𝑗 and 𝑀 is the total number of all possible combinations thus the probability of 
performing only one subsequent sub-process in a combination 𝑗,𝑃𝑟(𝐶𝑗) is calculated from Bayes’ 
formula in Equation(8) 
 Pr(𝑈𝑗) =
∏ 𝑃𝑖∀𝑖∈𝐶𝑗 ×∏ (1 − 𝑃𝑖)∀𝑖∉𝐶𝑗
1 − ∏ (1 − 𝑃𝑖)
𝑁
𝑖=1
 (8) 
So the process risk for the whole process becomes; 
 𝐸(𝑅𝑝) =  Pr(𝑈𝑗) ∗ ( ∑ ∑𝑑𝑖𝑗(Pij × C𝑖𝑗
𝑜𝑏𝑗)
J
j=1∀ i∈pk
) (9) 
It is highly likely that a single scenario have both the conjunctive and disjunctive (inclusive and 
exclusive) branching and therefore a combination of Equations (5), (7) and (9) are used to model 
the risk of the whole scenario. 
3. RISK ASSESSMENT METHODOLOGY 
Having defined the mathematical model for risk measurement in process setup, a risk assessment 
methodology is presented in this section. The proposed methodology relies on modeling, 
simulation and decision-making approaches and establishes a risk management process 
consisting of the following three phases: 
1. Context establishment  
2. Risk modeling and analysis 
3. Risk analysis via simulation 
Risk monitoring and control phase is not included in the methodology because the current study 
focus is solely on the risk assessment. The assessment phase consists of risk identification and 
risk evaluation. The risk assessment phase is supported with process analysis technique such as 
simulation. Each phase of the methodology is detailed in the following subsections.  
3.1 Context establishment phase 
Context is about defining external and internal parameters to be considered when managing risk 
and setting the scope and risk criteria for the risk management policy (ISO Guide 73:2009). In 
the framework of the current methodology, the context establishment phase identifies the 
application domain, the stakeholders of the process, their roles and responsibilities as well as the 
upper and lower bounds for each stakeholder’s expectations and concerns. Moreover, the focus 
of the risk assessment is also determined in the context establishment phase; whether the 
assessment is about a project or a business activity, merger or acquisition or overseeing a new 
production facility (Chapman, 2006, p. 109).  
In the framework of the current study, the context for risk management is set up using process 
models which are further enriched with statements about assets (name, value, type, and risk 
tolerance), stakeholders and relations between assets and stakeholders in terms of interest 
including stakeholders appetite of each stakeholder (Sienou et al., 2008). 
3.2 Risk modelling and analysis phase 
To account for risks in processes, the current methodology proposes a two pronged strategy: 
objectives-driven risk identification, and activity-based approach to risk assessment. The 
objective-driven approach is important because risk cannot be ascertained fully if objectives are 
unclear as risk by definition is the effect of uncertainty on business objectives (ISO 31000:2009). 
However, risk evaluation without (temporal) contextual information is incomplete and the 
process models enriched with additional statements are therefore required to establish the 
context.  
3.2.1 Objectives-oriented risk identification 
The general approach to risk identification starts with objectives identification (COSO, 2007). 
Relying on this theory, an objective-driven approach to risk identification is to find an assertion 
that obstructs the objectives attainment. For instance, if the global objective of a process is to 
satisfy customer order, then the corresponding global risk would be: “failure to satisfy customer 
order”. Many possible dimensions of the global risk are identified by decomposing it into lower 
level risks while employing principles of Value Focused Thinking (VFT), a decision-making 
methodology developed by Keeney (1992).  
Within the VFT framework, an objective is “a statement of something that one wants to strive 
toward” (Keeney, 1994). Keeney categorizes objectives into fundamental and means objectives. 
The former concerns the ends that the decision-makers (DM) value in a specific decision context, 
whereas the latter refers to the “methods to achieve fundamental objectives”.  For detail review 
and applications of VFT, the interested reader is referred to (Parnell et al. 2013).  
In the context of risk management, the fundamental objectives of the VFT are “risk objectives” 
whereas, the means objectives will be termed “risk factors”. Because, the theme of the risk 
management is to “minimize certain risk” and here the minimization has a preference orientation 
so it is an objective per VFT technique. Also, similar to means objectives, which are the ways to 
achieve the fundamental objectives, risk factors are the means that determine the likelihood of a 
risk occurrence. A chain/network of risk factors contributes to risk objectives in the risk 
hierarchy. For the sake of simplicity, risk objective is simply called risk in the current study. 
To apply VFT for risk identification and structuring, the principle of “specification” is used. 
Specification generally aims to break down an objective into logical parts (Keeney, 1996, p. 68). 
A simple question: “What do you mean by that” is sufficient to specify, refine and characterize 
the upper level risk into lower level. This decomposition mechanism transforms global risk into 
more measurable risks while keeping in view the objectives of the process understudy. For 
example, the question “what do you mean by failure to satisfy customer order?” brings forward 
lower level risks such as technical performance risk, incomplete order fulfillment risk, schedule 
risk and cost overrun, which correspond to quality, reliability, on-time delivery and cost 
objectives of the process. To refine further, schedule risk means delay in order processing, 
manufacturing and logistic or distribution. Each part (tasks) of the process (order satisfaction) 
has its own deliverables and associated risks. It is noteworthy that each risk on the lower level is 
a dimension or specification of the upper level risk and assumed to holds the axiom of 
preferential independent  (Kirkwood and Sarin, 1980). That is risk of order processing is 
independent of logistic risk and also of manufacturing related risks. But all risks when added 
together contribute to scheduling risk. Figure 3 shows a risk hierarchy for customer order 
satisfaction process. 
Failure to satisfy 
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Figure 3: Risk hierarchy 
“What causes the risk event to occur?” brings forward the factors for each risk in the lower tier 
of the risk hierarchy (cf. Figure 3). For instance, the manufacturing delay is a fundamental risk 
but can be triggered by frequent quality failures. So, quality failures are the means (contributing 
factor) to the manufacturing delay. Other risk factors can be disruption (machine breakdown) 
which is further related to other risk factors such as improper machine maintenance, overrunning 
machine capability, ignoring warning signals etc. such are the factors which form chain/network 
and contribute to machine breakdown. However, machine breakdown is not a fundamental risk 
per se but a factor to major risk such as manufacturing delay which affects the customer 
satisfaction objective. In a similar way, risk factors are identified for cost overrun and technical 
performance. Once done, a network of risk factors is formed and is linked to the objective risk as 
shown in Figure 4 
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Figure 4: Risk factors network for manufacturing lead time risk 
Risk factors identification is mandatory for risk monitoring and control. To minimize the 
probability of risk happening, risk factors should be identified, prioritized and mitigation actions 
should be developed.  
The risk hierarchy and risk factor networks are sufficient to map all the relevant risks and their 
causes in any given scenario. However, the identified risks with their risk factors cannot be 
assessed because they lack the contextual information. For this purpose, they are further 
investigated in the (business) process environment where they may happen.  
3.2.2 Process-based risk analysis 
The identified risks of the risk hierarchy are assessed using the FMEA technique. For this reason, 
the required contextual information is obtained from the process model. Because the process 
model contains sufficient information regarding the execution of the activities and their 
environment, they are therefore consulted when analyzing a particular risk. For instance, without 
knowing the type of machine/tool and operator to be employed to machine a critical feature of a 
mechanical part, it is difficult to know whether the risk may be triggered or not and, hence, risk 
assessment cannot be performed. It is therefore essential to identify those activities responsible 
for (in the case of internal risk factors) or prune to (in the case of external risk factors) the 
identified risks. To this end, a risk/activity matrix is developed which links the risks of the risk 
hierarchy to the activities of the process model (cf. Table 1). 
Table 1: Activity/risk matrix 
 𝑅1 𝑅2 𝑅3 𝑅4 𝑅5 𝑅6  
Activity 1       
Activity 2       
Activity 3       
For instance, 𝑅5 represents the “serviceability risk”, a subset of performance risk and is 
associated to 𝐴𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑖𝑡𝑦 1 and 𝐴𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑖𝑡𝑦 3 (facing and tapering operations respectively, see (Shah, 
2012, p. 242)). Assume 𝑅1 to be a manufacturing lead time risk and linked with 𝐴𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑖𝑡𝑦 2  and 
𝐴𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑖𝑡𝑦 3 due to process novelty and complexity which results into a manufacturing delay. 
Similarly, all risks of the risk hierarchy are linked to responsible activities of the process 
scenario. In the next step, they are analyzed qualitatively using Process FMEA technique. Table 
2 shows a subset of schedule risk analyzed in the FMEA. Here, risk event of the manufacturing 
lead-time risk is analyzed and RPN is calculated. The objective is to determine whether it is 
worth further analysis or not.  
Table 2: Process FMEA for Schedule Risk 
Process Failure mode Causes Effects P C D RPN 
Activity i Duration 
estimation error 
Process  
- novelty 
- complexity 
Uncertain lead 
time 
5 7 6 210 
By analyzing qualitatively risk events in the PFMEA Table, the most critical ones are then 
integrated into the process model for quantitative analysis in the simulation environment as 
shown in  
Figure 5. 5 (pb) 
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Figure 5: Excerpt from a risk aware manufacturing process plan model 
To analyze risk events of the process model quantitatively, the risk measurement model 
described in section 2 is employed in simulation experiment.  
3.3 Risk analysis via simulation phase  
Quantitative risk evaluation requires quantitative data regarding risk event parameters which can 
be obtained from the historical records employing statistical analysis (Ahmed et al. 2007). 
However, in the a priori evaluation of processes, such data do not usually exist. If they exist, 
they are either not enough or not in the shape to be used. In such circumstances, simulation is the 
right tool that can generate sufficient data regarding risk parameters that the simulation model 
can use later to estimate risk measures. To carry out simulation experiments for this purpose, 
input data for simulation are generated.  
Input data gathering: The input data required for risk analysis in the simulation environment can 
be divided into three categories: functional data (activities), parameters to make the conceptual 
process model executable and risk evaluation methods. The former data are obtained in the 
context establishment phase by process modeling of the scenario using IDEF3 method. For the 
parameters, it is advisable to divide them into several categories such as run parameters (job 
arrival law, arrival type: batch or single entity arrival, warm-up period and so on) process plan 
parameters (i.e. operation times) and objectives related parameters (i.e. order quantity) as 
described in (Shah et al., 2012; Shah, 2012). Concerning the evaluation methods (see Table 3), 
they are formula required to analyze the scenario. 
Table 3: Evaluation Methods 
Risk Measures   Calculation Method 
Cost overrun 
𝑅𝑐(𝑃𝑃𝑘) =∑𝑃𝑖(𝐶𝑖 > 𝑈𝐵) ∗ 𝐶(𝑥)
𝑛
𝑖=1
 
Schedule Risk  
𝑅𝑠(𝑃𝑃𝑘) =∑𝑃𝑖(𝐶𝑖 > 𝑑𝑢𝑒𝑑𝑎𝑡𝑒) ∗ 𝐶(𝑥)
𝑛
𝑖=1
 
Quality Risk  
𝑅𝑞(𝑃𝑃𝑘) =∑  𝑃𝑖(𝑄𝑖 ≠ 𝑆𝑝𝑒𝑐𝑠) ∗ 𝐶
𝑛
𝑖=1
 
  
For computing the risk of cost overrun, an upper bound (UB) for the cost is defined. Cost values 
falling beyond the upper bound will trigger risk event; however, its impact is a function of 𝑥 i.e. 
deviation of the outcome from the upper bound. The more the value deviates, the higher is the 
risk. It may be a linear or non-linear function to a point beyond which the impact can grow 
exponentially. Same is the case for the schedule risk. A customer can wait for an order to arrive 
up to certain time beyond that either the penalty applies (a function of 𝑥; where 𝑥 is delay time 
after due date). For the quality risk, product specifications are important. Tolerances are defined 
and any feature beyond tolerance may impact the proper functioning of a part or product as a 
whole and hence the improper tolerance can trigger a performance or technical risk. 
Simulation experimentations and output data collection: Having defined the input data, the risk 
aware process model (conceptual model) is transformed into a simulation model. The simulation 
parameters and evaluation method are fed into the simulation model. In the probabilistic setup, 
the simulation model generates random data for each parameter and estimates risk measures of 
interest (cf. Table 3). They are used in the risk evaluation phase to pass on judgment on each risk 
measure w.r.t the defined risk criteria.   
In the case of multiple risk measures of heterogeneous nature (cost vs. time), it is advisable to 
develop a commensurate scale defined on the interval [0,1]. The evaluation, then, of different 
risk measures will make sense. Multi-criteria decision making techniques can be employed for 
the purpose. 
4. Risks evaluation and aggregation via multi-criteria decision-making phase 
Risk evaluation means estimating significance or judging the acceptability of the risk. The 
significance or judgment of a risk can only be established when compared against its target 
value, upper and lower bounds. In addition, risk measures obtained from simulation experiments 
are heterogeneous in nature and most often large in numbers. Therefore, it is desirable to 
consider multiple criteria decision-making technique(s) which develops a normalized value 
function (also called utility function) for each risk measure. This is carried out by comparing 
each risk measure against its UB and LB. It also set the stage for aggregation of the normalized 
risk measures (henceforth, risk expressions) to facilitate decision-making process. 
In the multi-criteria model of the current methodology, risk measures are normalized using the 
MACBETH method. Determination of interaction among risk measures is carried out using 
Choquet capacity while aggregation is performed using the 2-additive Choquet integral.  
4.1 MACBETH 
MACBETH (Measuring Attractiveness by a Categorical Based Evaluation TecHnique) is a 
multi-criteria decision analysis approach used to determine value functions as well as aggregated 
ones while comparing different scenarios (Bane e Costa and Vansnick, 1999). Similar to value 
functions, risk functions set reflects decision-makers’ (DMs) preferences or judgments of risk 
criteria with reference to fictive situations. Two situations are compared pairwise for a risk 
criterion and thus ordinal information is obtained, which is then transformed into cardinal 
information through “difference of attractiveness”. The preference through difference of 
attractiveness is quite natural to decision-makers who usually rely on verbal levels of 
attractiveness such as {null, very weak, weak, moderate, strong, very strong, extreme} (Bana e 
Costa and Vansnick, 1994). Details about the MACBETH method application can be found in 
the literature (Cliville et al., 2007). 
In the current study, the MACBETH procedure is used to develop risk expressions 𝑟𝑖 
(normalized value of individual risk of 𝑅𝑖) by solving inter criteria commensurability issue and 
to map them on a [0, 1] scale. Because MACBETH relies on the weighted mean to aggregate risk 
expressions, which is often not the case in real-life examples where criteria may interact, the 
Choquet integral has been chosen as the operator for the aggregation of risk expressions. It can 
handle interdependencies among different risk functions through Choquet capacity.  
4.2 Choquet Integral (CI) 
 To aggregate the risk functions  𝑟𝑖 , the following 2-additive Choquet integral mathematical 
model is used (Grabisch et al., 2008): 
 Cu(x) =∑viri −
1
2
n
i=1
∑Iij|ri − rj|
n
i=1
 (10) 
Where 𝐶𝑢  models vectors of risk expressions 𝑟𝑖 , 𝑣𝑖  denotes a Shapely index with ∑ 𝑣𝑖 = 1
𝑛
𝑖=1  
that represents importance of risk expression 𝑟𝑖 relative to all other risks expressions and 𝐼𝑖𝑗 , 
interaction between risk expressions (𝑟𝑖, 𝑟𝑗), ranging in [-1,1]. To calculate the unknown CI 
parameters (𝑣𝑖  & 𝐼𝑖𝑗), two fictive situation are considered besides alternative processes and are 
ranked pairwise and individually (Clivillé et al., 2007; Shah, 2013). A preference ranking of 
these situations along with the strength of preferences gives a system of equations whose 
solution determines the Choquet Integral parameters. 
In such preference modeling, the alternatives satisfy one or two risk expressions simultaneously. 
The situations where only one 𝑅𝑖 = 1 and all others are equal to zero, the aggregated value is as 
follows:  
 
R𝑎𝑔
𝑖 = 𝑣𝑖 −
1
2
∑𝐼𝑖𝑗
𝑛
𝑗=1
𝑗≠𝑖
 
(11) 
The aggregated value of the situations where one 𝑅𝑖  =0 and all other equals to 1 will be as 
follows: 
 
R𝑎𝑔
𝑖 = 1 − 𝑣𝑖 −
1
2
∑𝐼𝑖𝑗
𝑛
𝑗=1
𝑗≠𝑖
 
(12) 
In brief, the decision-making techniques are used to solve the following problem 
 
 𝑉(𝑅) = 𝐹(𝑣(𝑟1) + 𝑣(𝑟2)…𝑣(𝑟𝑛)) (13) 
Where, 
𝑟 ∈ 𝑅  An attribute or risk measure of set 𝑅(risk set from the risk hierarchy) 
𝑣(𝑟) Risk function (risk expression) 
𝑉(𝑅) Global risk function (global risk indicator) 
𝐹  Aggregation operator (CI) 
𝑣(𝑥) or simply 𝑥𝑖 are determined using the MACBETH procedure while the operator 𝐹 (Choquet 
Integral in the current study) is employed to aggregate the risk expressions to form global risk 
indicator. 
5. APPLICATION 
The methodology is illustrated on a case study about a manufacturing company that designs and 
fabricates product on make-to-order (MTO) basis. The reference product for this case study is a 
mechanical locator (Figure 6), a work holding device used for centering of job on a machine-
tool.  
Axle
Cap
Body
Spring
Bolt
Loaded workpiece 
clamped
 
Figure 6: Mechanical Locator 
To illustrate the use of the proposed methodology within the company, a manufacturing scenario 
is defined. 
5.1 Case study: Manufacturing Scenario 
The company under study receives an order for 200 high quality mechanical locators from a 
customer with a lead time of two weeks (10 working days). The price of the product is kept at 
$14 /per unit. So, the most critical objective in the scenario is technical performance of the 
product, measured in terms of satisfaction index (q) (Anselmetti, 2008). 
The company has sufficient resources at its disposal, therefore parts: axle, body and cap are 
machined at the facility while springs and bolts are purchased from the market. We assume that 
all raw materials and the purchased parts are available whenever needed.  
Failing to satisfy the customer order will cause penalty cost. A product having satisfaction index 
below 0.8 are rejected. In case of delay after the tolerance period (2 days), the company has to 
pay $2/unit time tardiness up to 5 working days for each product, beyond this period the order is 
cancelled and backlog cost of $10 per unit is paid. In addition, upper bound cost is set to $18.)  
Having described the manufacturing scenario, the proposed risk assessment methodology is then 
applied to determine the level of risk involved in the scenario.  
5.2 Application of the methodology to the mfg. scenario 
To assess risks involved in the manufacturing scenario, the company generates manufacturing 
process plans for the reference product. For this purpose, the methodology described in Sormaz 
and Khoshnevis (2003) have been adopted. To develop alternative process plans, the product is 
decomposed into geometrical features. To manufacture each feature, process candidates are 
selected using inquiries to the appropriate knowledge base of the manufacturing processes. Once 
the process plans are generated, they are then modelled using IDEF3 modelling method.  
To identify risks and the corresponding risk factors, objectives-oriented risk identification 
approach is used.  A global risk: “failure to satisfy customer order” for the scenario is fixed and 
decomposed into schedule risk, cost overrun and performance risk. Since critical objective for 
the customer order fulfillment is the technical performance of the product, therefore, this facet of 
the risk is further decomposed into more refined facets. In the second step, risk factors for each 
identified risk are determined. The identified risks and risk factors are then structured into risk 
hierarchy and risk network respectively similar to Figure 3 and Figure 4. To determine risk 
parameters for the risk events, they are first contextualized using activity/risk matrix. Once 
linked, they are then analyzed in the process FMEA Table (cf. Table 4) 
Table 4: Excerpt of PFMEA for quality risks (Shah, 2013) 
Processes Requirements Failure 
mode 
Causes Effects P C D RPN 
Tapering 
operation 
(F2, Axle)  
 
Coax. ⌀ .04mm 
(req. S9) 
Axle cone 
not locate 
the work 
piece(WP) 
Improper 
assembly 
tolerance 
allocation 
Unable to hold the 
WP rightly 
5 7 6 210 
Parting   
F2 (Cap), 
Facing F7 
(Body) 
Tolerance 
interval 0.04 of 
Plan A w.r.t Plan   
B (req. S1) 
Poor 
length of 
the parts 
Malfunctioning 
of the 
mechanical 
locator 
Improper assembly 
tolerance allocation,                     
wrong  machine set 
up 
8 5 5 200 
 
High RPN risks are integrated into the process plan model for further analysis in the simulation 
environment. To calculate the probability of a risk event, it is sufficient to observe and record at 
a critical activity (whose risk is of concern) in the simulation model; the number of times the 
activity objective is not achieved divided by the total number of observations made. For 
determining the impact of a risk event, an impact function 𝑦 = 𝑓(𝑥) is calculated. For example, 
in case of delay, the formula: 𝑦 = 𝑎. 𝑒𝑏𝑥 is employed where a and b are the coefficients and 𝑥 is 
the dependent variable indicating the range which exceeds the due date. Similarly, the cost 
impact function is calculated assuming a quadratic function (i.e. per unit cost overrun 𝑥 has an 
impact 𝑥2). For the quality failure impact, the severity scale of the FMEA is used. 
For quantitative analysis of the risk events, the risk aware process plan models are transformed 
into executable simulation models. They are then simulated using the discrete event simulation 
software: Rockwell ARENA v.13.5. Ten independent replications for each process plan were 
run. In each replication run, process plan and scenario related parameters were loaded into the 
simulation model and risk measures estimates are obtained as presented in Table 5. 
Table 5: Simulation Results for manufacturing process plans 
 
 Schedule risk (𝑅1) Cost overrun(𝑅2) Performance risk (𝑅3) 
Mfg. process plan 1 0.28 5.57 3.96 
Mfg. process plan 2 
0.71 2.46 4.12 
Mfg. process plan 3 
3.6 0.415 3.94 
Since risk measures obtained from simulation experimentations are simply numbers they carry 
no clear meaning. They are therefore normalized for solving the issue of commensurability 
among risk measures.  For this purpose, first, two fictive situations representing upper and lower 
bounds for each measure are defined. (In the case of cost, SIB “Smaller Is Better” means the 
lesser the cost, the better the utility and for the quality, NIB “Nominal Is Better” means the target 
value or nominal is preferable). So “Good” situation means SIB for cost and schedule while NIB 
for quality. Next, process plans and the two fictive situations are ranked in the desirability order 
along with strength of preferences (ℎ𝑖  , 𝑖 = 1 𝑡𝑜 6) as follow: 
𝑅1 ⇒ 𝐺𝑜𝑜𝑑 >
1 𝑃𝑃1 >2 𝑃𝑃2 >5 𝑃𝑃3 >1 𝑁𝑒𝑢𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑙  
𝑅2  ⇒  𝐺𝑜𝑜𝑑 >
1 𝑃𝑃3 >4 𝑃𝑃2 >5 𝑃𝑃1 >1 𝑁𝑒𝑢𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑙 
𝑅3  ⇒  𝐺𝑜𝑜𝑑 >
3 𝑃𝑃3 >1 𝑃𝑃1 >2 𝑃𝑃2 >1 𝑁𝑒𝑢𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑙 
The preference modeling information is next transformed into risk expressions using 
MACBETH procedure. The resulting risk expressions are then populated in Table 6. 
Table 6: Risk expressions (normalized risk measures from MACBETH)  
 𝑅1 expression 𝑅2 expression 𝑅3 expression 
Mfg. process plan 1 0.12 0.98 0.66 
Mfg. process plan 2 0.38 0.57 0.78 
Mfg. process plan 3 0.88 0.14 0.56 
Risk expressions 𝑟𝑖  as well as the CI parameters (𝑣𝑖  & 𝐼𝑖𝑗 ) identified via Equations (11) & 
(12)are put in Equation (10) and global risk for each process plan is calculated ( 
 
Table 7).  
 
Table 7: global risk indicator for manufacturing process plans 
 Global Risk 𝐼𝑖𝑗 & 𝑣𝑖 for risk measures 
𝐼𝑖𝑗 𝑣𝑖 
Manufacturing process plan 1 𝟎. 𝟓𝟑 𝐼12 = 0.09 𝑣1 = 0.34 
Manufacturing process plan 2 𝟎. 𝟓𝟗 𝐼13 = 0.13 𝑣2 = 0.18 
Manufacturing process plan 3 𝟎. 𝟓𝟔 𝐼23 = 0.10 𝑣3 = 0.48 
 
From  
 
Table 7, it can be concluded that manufacturing process plan 1 involves the least risk (0.53) 
followed by process plan 3 (0.56) and process plan 2 with a maximum risk score of 0.59. 
Furthermore, the technical performance being the critical risk in the scenario carries more weight 
with a Shapley index of (0.48) followed by schedule risk (0.34) and cost overrun (0.18). 
Similarly, the interaction among schedule & cost, schedule & performance, and cost & 
performance risks are respectively  0.09 , 0.13  and  0.10 .  A comparatively high positive 
interaction effect is observed between schedule and quality (performance) risks (i.e. 0.13), this is 
because quality failures lead to manufacturing delay.  
6. CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE WORK 
A process-oriented risk assessment methodology for manufacturing processes has been 
presented. The methodology establishes a risk identification and process and provides tools and 
techniques to develop a global risk indicator that can be used a decision-making tool to rank 
alternative manufacturing processes on the basis of desirability. The methodology is tested with a 
case study which supports both its conceptual and operational validity. Moreover, the current 
study stresses on the need to identify major or global risk and then decompose them using 
specification principle of the Value Focused Thinking technique (VFT). The decomposition of 
global risk into lower level risks and then identification of the risk factors and linkage of the 
latter with the former provides a risk structure for the scenario understudy. The risk structuring 
alone provides an insight and can help risk manager while devising mitigation plans. 
In authors’ view, risk identification is the most crucial part to any risk management activity, 
however it is mostly ignored in many risk assessment techniques. Brainstorming and historical 
data are the tools mostly used for risk profiling but a systematic approach to risk identification is 
missing in the literature. The current study proposes the risk identification process using 
objective-driven approach and integrates it with other assessment techniques—process model, 
FMEA and simulation techniques. For evaluation and ease of decision-making, the risk measures 
are normalized and aggregated. Although long the methodology is reasonably thorough and 
handy regarding assessment of risks in the process context. 
To further enhance the applicability of the methodology, it will be extended to model the 
causality relationship between risk factors and risk events via Bayesian network. In addition, cost 
effective risk mitigation strategy will be incorporated. A risk acceptability zone vis-à-vis value 
(objectives) will also be defined to make the proposed methodology more robust for decision-
making. 
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